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EFFECTS OF CARBON REDUCTION LABELS: EVIDENCE FROM
SCANNER DATA
MIKA KORTELAINEN, JIBONAYAN RAYCHAUDHURI and BEATRICE ROUSSILLON∗
We investigate the effects of carbon reduction labels using a detailed scanner
data set. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we find that having a
carbon label has no impact on detergent prices or demand. We also investigate possible
heterogeneous effects of carbon labels using the synthetic control method. We find no
evidence to indicate that the prices for the counterfactual detergents without the label
would have been any different from the prices of the carbon-labeled detergents. We
investigate the reasons for these results and conclude that the specific design of the
carbon label is responsible for its lack of success. (JEL D12, D83, L15, Q54)
I. INTRODUCTION
Households in the EU are responsible for 25%
of total EU greenhouse gas emissions.1 In an
effort to reduce household greenhouse gas emis-
sions, the Carbon Trust Fund in the United King-
dom has introduced a new product label called the
carbon reduction label for many common house-
hold goods. This carbon label shows the approx-
imate number of grams of carbon dioxide that
a product generates during its life cycle, that is,
as the product is grown or manufactured, trans-
ported, stored, and used (Figure 1). More than
27,000 goods (or services) in the United King-
dom now carry this label and it is estimated
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1. See the recent report published by the European
Environment Agency, which can be downloaded from
the website: http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/end-use-
energy-emissions.
that the label appears on goods worth 3.3 billion
pounds in annual sales.2 The objective of these
carbon labels is to move households’ behavior
toward lower amounts of carbon consumption.3
To examine if the carbon label is effective one
could test if households are willing to pay more
for goods that have a carbon label or a lower car-
bon footprint (less carbon dioxide emissions over
the lifetime of the good). If consumers are will-
ing to pay more for carbon-labeled (or low carbon
footprint) goods, there is an incentive for firms to
lower the carbon footprint of their goods, label
them accordingly, and charge a higher price. So
an indirect test of the effectiveness of the car-
bon reduction label is the emergence of a higher
price (or a price premium) for goods that have
the carbon label vis-à-vis other similar goods that
do not have the carbon label. In this study, we
investigate the effectiveness of the carbon reduc-
tion label using real market data from a major
supermarket chain in the United Kingdom. In
particular, we examine whether a specific cat-
egory of carbon-labeled goods—carbon-labeled
2. From the website of the Carbon Trust at:
http://www.carbontrust.com/client-services/footprinting/
footprint-certification.
3. For a detailed discussion on carbon labeling and its
potential usefulness in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, see
Cohen and Vandenbergh (2012) and references cited therein.
ABBREVIATIONS
AIDS: Almost Ideal Demand System
ATT: Average Treatment Effect for the Treated
DID: Difference-in-Difference
GDA: Guide Daily Amount
1
Economic Inquiry
(ISSN 0095-2583) doi:10.1111/ecin.12278
© 2015 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Western Economic Association International.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and
distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
2 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
detergents—obtain a price premium compared to
detergents without the label.
This study contributes to the literature on car-
bon labeling in two important ways. First, in
contrast with previous empirical studies on car-
bon labels, our data are not limited to a spe-
cific location or to a specific store but are based
on observed consumer behavior in the whole of
the United Kingdom. Second, in our data we
observe transaction prices for labeled and unla-
beled detergents before and after the labeling
started. This feature of our data allows us to uti-
lize standard microeconometric techniques (elab-
orated below) to tease out the average treatment
effect. Our empirical analysis concentrates on the
impact of the carbon reduction labels on deter-
gent prices as we do not have either the aggregate
sales data for individual products or the data on
customers’ purchases in stores of other supermar-
ket chains. However, as a robustness check we
also estimate simple demand models. In contrast
to previous experimental studies on carbon labels
(discussed below), in the United Kingdom (and
therefore also in our data) the carbon labels used
are complicated and include detailed information
on the carbon dioxide emissions of the products
(i.e., the number of grams of CO2 emissions).
Given this detailed information and the fact that
people’s buying behavior may be different in a
market setting than in the laboratory, it is interest-
ing to investigate the impact of the carbon label
with real market data. Real market data also allow
us to account for the effect of search costs, which
are typically (or implicitly) assumed to be zero in
the laboratory and in choice experiments. Recent
work by Seiler (2013) shows the presence of high
search costs in the detergent market and hence we
would expect search costs to have an effect on the
willingness to pay for carbon-labeled detergents
in our case as well.
We make use of two methods to test for
the emergence of a higher price for carbon-
labeled detergents. The first method is a standard
difference-in-differences (DID) regression that
takes advantage of the fact that some of the deter-
gents were labeled sometime after our data starts.
This method allows us to estimate the average
impact of the carbon reduction label on the deter-
gent prices. However, as the impact of the carbon
reduction label can be different for products with
different carbon footprints (i.e., products with
different carbon labels), it is also important to
investigate whether treatment effects vary across
labeled products (i.e., if we have heterogeneous
treatment effects). To address this question, we
use a relatively new technique called the syn-
thetic control method.4 We use this method to
estimate the counterfactual price trajectories for
each labeled product individually. We then com-
pare the price trajectories of the counterfactual
detergents with real carbon-labeled detergents.
We also estimate simple demand models (in a
DID setup) to examine the impact of the carbon
reduction label on the sales of carbon-labeled
detergents. The results we get from the DID
regressions show that on average the carbon
reduction label has no effect on price, that is,
there is no price premium for detergents that
have a carbon label. We do not find any demand
impacts for the carbon reduction label either,
although we note that the results of the demand
models might be sensitive to the sample that we
use in estimation. Finally, the results obtained
using the synthetic control method indicate that
there is no evidence that prices would had been
higher/lower for products with low/high level of
carbon emissions compared to the corresponding
counterfactual products without the label.
Our study is one of the first empirical papers to
systematically study the effects of a carbon label
using real market data in a quasi-experimental
setup. Although there is a relatively large theo-
retical and empirical literature on labeling, there
have been very few empirical studies investi-
gating the carbon label and its effectiveness.
This lacuna may result from the fact that carbon
labels were introduced only a few years ago. In
recent years, a few experimental studies have
investigated the effectiveness of carbon label.
Using a simple experiment Michaud, Llerena,
and Joly (2013) find a significant price premium
for low carbon footprint products. However,
the choice setting that the study exploits in the
experimental design is very different from a real
life purchase choice and therefore the external
4. Another option could be to use the DID setup and
estimate separate treatment effects for each labeled product
(using interactions or separate subsamples of these products).
However, as Conley and Taber (2011) show (see also Donald
and Lang 2007), the conventional statistical inference meth-
ods are not consistent for DID when there are a small number
of treated units and a large number of control units. This is
clearly a problem in our setting, as allowing heterogeneous
treatment effects would allow us to have only one unit in
the treatment group (for each treated product considered) and
many products in the control group. In addition, we note that
as the synthetic control method does not require the com-
mon trend assumption or any additional assumptions about
the specific type of parametric functional form used, it is more
flexible and robust than the DID setup when studying hetero-
geneous treatment effects.
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validity of the results can be weak.5 Also, using
a conjoint choice experiment (included in a 2008
U.S. survey), Onozaka and Mcfadden (2011)
find some evidence to show that labels which
signal carbon intensity of a product can have
a negative impact on the effectiveness of other
environmental labels. Finally, Vanclay et al.
(2011) study the effectiveness of a traffic light
style carbon label placed on the shelves in one
grocery store in Australia. Interestingly, they find
the shelf labels to have a small positive impact
on the sales of the least carbon intensive products
and a negative impact on the sales of most carbon
intensive products during an 8-week follow-up
period. Although their results may capture real
market behavior, the study is limited in scope
and duration. Moreover, as the experimental
design they use is not very rigorous, it is difficult
to evaluate the impact of the labels based on
their results.6
The rest of the article is structured as fol-
lows: Section II presents a literature review and
our setting which help to delineate the differ-
ent types of price premium that we could possi-
bly observe in the data; Section III describes the
data for the paper and the methods used in the
empirical analysis; Section IV gives the results of
the empirical analysis, while Section V discusses
the results and policy implications; and Section
VI concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND SETTING
In this section, we review the main theoretical
and empirical literature on the effects of label-
ing. In addition, we outline some factors that
may affect the effectiveness of environmental
labels and discuss how these factors pertain to
our setting.
A. Theoretical Results
The theoretical literature predicts that the
introduction of a carbon label should lead to a
price premium (in our case a “carbon premium”).
The intuition behind this result is the following:
a consumer gets higher utility from consuming
5. For instance, Michaud et al. (2013) consider only three
different product characteristics in the experimental design:
a product price, an eco-label, and a carbon footprint with
two different levels (high emissions vs. low emissions). The
carbon label used in their experiments is much simpler than
the labels typically used in the real market.
6. One particular weakness related to the design is that
they do not look at the changes in sales of unlabeled products.
a more environmentally friendly good, which
leads to a higher willingness to pay for that
good and in turn leads to a higher price for that
good.7 The label allows firms to either seg-
ment the market or differentiate their products.
More specifically, a large number of theoreti-
cal models mainly use the Mussa and Rosen’s
(1978) utility function or its variant (Bonroy and
Constantatos 2015):8
(1) U (θ) = θq − p,
where θ represents the consumer willingness to
pay for the product and it is assumed to be uni-
formly distributed in [0; 1], while q represents the
product quality or environmental friendliness and
p the product price.
In the above setup, we can expect the intro-
duction of a label to lead to an increase of the
labeled product price independent of market con-
ditions or on the level of competition. We now go
through three distinct cases, where a price pre-
mium can emerge for labeled products. First, it
is well known that the introduction of a label
in a competitive market will segment the mar-
ket into two: the labeled market and the unla-
beled market. In the labeled market, demand will
increase (consumers have higher willingness to
pay for environmentally friendly product) and
supply may decrease (generally only few firms
can comply with the label requirements) result-
ing in a higher price for the labeled product
(see Bonroy and Constantatos 2015; Mattoo and
Singh 1994; Sedjo and Swallow 2002; Zago and
Pick 2004). In the unlabeled market, if the num-
ber of firms remaining in the market is higher
than the number of consumers still willing to
buy the unlabeled product, then the price will
decrease (otherwise the price can remain constant
or increase). Second, a monopoly can also choose
to segment their market due to the label. In this
case, monopoly could switch to a mass market-
ing strategy where it provides one product for the
whole market or to a segmentation strategy where
it produces two different variants of a good: a
green and a polluting variant. The segmentation
7. It is typically assumed that consumers obtain a higher
utility from the consumption of green product because of a
warm glow effect (Andreoni 1990). They feel better knowing
that they have contributed to the environment protection.
8. See the literature review by Bonroy and Constantatos
(2015) for details. Two classic variants of this utility function
are the consideration of a degenerated distribution or the per-
ception of the product quality q. In the former case, we only
have two groups of consumers: one valuing the environment
and the other not.
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strategy allows the monopoly to exploit more
consumer surplus by imposing a higher price for
the green (labeled) product. If the fixed costs of
producing the green product are not too high then
the segmentation is always the most profitable
strategy and results in a price increase for the
labeled product. In this case, the price of the unla-
beled product can decrease or remain the same
depending on potential cannibalization (Chen
2001).9 Third, the introduction of the label allows
for vertical product differentiation (Bonroy and
Constantatos 2015).10 In a duopoly, facing price
competition and selling homogenous products,
the Bertrand paradox will lead to price equaling
marginal cost with no profit for either of the two
firms. After the introduction of the label, price
competition among firms may decrease because
of vertical product differentiation with the green
product corresponding to the high quality prod-
uct. In this case, the price of the labeled and the
unlabeled product will both increase. However,
the price increase of the labeled product will be
much higher (more than twice in the most sim-
ple case with zero marginal cost) than the price
increase of the unlabeled product (for a litera-
ture review presenting these different models, see
Bonroy and Constantatos 2015 and Mason 2013).
It is also worth noting that an environmentally
friendly product is typically considered costlier to
produce than its polluting equivalent. The label-
ing cost can be divided in two parts: the first
part is a compliance cost as the product should
achieve a certain environmental quality in order
to get the label; and the second part corresponds
to the certification cost coming from the monitor-
ing and testing of the product. A possible increase
in cost has to be compensated by an increase
in price.
There are also theoretical reasons to expect
small or even zero price premiums. If we relax
the assumption that the consumers fully (blindly)
trust and understand the label then the emergence
of a price premium is less likely as we explain in
the following three scenarios below. First, con-
sumers may believe that firms can fraudulently
label polluting or environmentally unfriendly
products, in which case price premiums may fail
9. Recently, Houde (2014) has shown using a structural
demand model that firms use the certification to price discrim-
inate their products.
10. As mentioned by Bonroy and Constantatos (2015),
this idea is very close to the model of vertical product differ-
entiation of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) with the labeled
product representing the high quality product and the pollu-
tant product representing the low quality product.
to emerge. In competitive markets, firms have
a high incentive to fraudulently affix a label on
their polluting products (see Hamilton and Zil-
berman 2006). Second, the type of certification
matters for the emergence of a premium. Self-
labeling may produce smaller price premiums
than third party certification as the former is
less credible. Finally, consumers may be unsure
about the value of the label. They may know it
means that the firms have passed the certification
standard requirements, but they probably will
not know the difficulty of these requirements. In
such a case, consumers may use the number of
firms using labeling to estimate the difficulty of
having the label and thus its value. The price pre-
miums can therefore be decreasing in the number
of products which have the label (Harbaugh,
Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011).
To conclude, the emergence of price premiums
for a labeled product is to be expected in most sit-
uations.11 The situations where the emergence of
a premium is unlikely include the case of a com-
petitive market, where one can have fraudulent
labels, or when there are a large number of firms
using the label. In any case, it should be noted that
the results elaborated above depend on a num-
ber of specific assumptions that may not be true
in reality.
B. Price Premiums in Practice
Empirically, the emergence of a price
premium for an environmental label and
the magnitude of the premium conditional
on its emergence depends on the following
three factors:
1. Consumers’ valuation of the environmental
characteristic.
2. Consumers’ awareness of the label. A con-
sumer needs to look for the label resulting in a
search cost.
3. Consumers’ understanding of the label.
This depends on consumers’ cognitive ability to
process the information on the label.
Regarding consumers’ valuation of the envi-
ronmental characteristic, many studies using the
hedonic approach have found considerable price
premium for organic products (see, e.g., Griffith
and Nesheim 2013 or Nimon and Beghin 1999).
However, organic products are often considered
11. Note that the existence of a price premium
does not mean that the introduction of a label will be
welfare enhancing.
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as a tastier and healthier alternative to their
nonorganic counterparts and therefore they incor-
porate some private benefit as well as attributes
of a public good type. Note that in general taste
and nutritional aspects of the good are much
more important for consumers than the environ-
mental characteristics of the good (see Bougher-
ara and Combris 2009; Fletcher and Downing
2011; Gadema and Oglethorpe 2011; Griffith and
Nesheim 2013).12
For the specific case of the carbon label,
Michaud et al. (2013) and Vanclay et al. (2011)
have found a price premium using an experi-
mental approach suggesting that consumers value
products with a low carbon footprint.13 In a recent
survey, Hartikainen et al. (2014) find positive atti-
tudes toward carbon labels in an online-survey of
1,010 Finnish consumers and report that “90%
stated that a carbon footprint would have at least
a little impact on their buying decision, but the
information became meaningful only when many
other purchasing criteria (such as price and taste)
were satisfied.”
Consumers’ difficulty in noticing the label,
which is typically more likely to be the case in
real markets than in experimental and stated pref-
erence settings, appears to be an important factor
in the emergence of a price premium (Rubik and
Frankl 2005; Thogersen 2000). Related to this,
Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004) show in an
experimental framework that consumers may not
read the label and thus buy GMO products despite
their claimed animosity toward these products. In
our case, the carbon reduction label is placed at
12. Other relevant papers include Teisl, Roe, and Hicks
(2002) and Houde (2014). Teisl et al. (2002) use the almost
ideal demand system (AIDS) model to estimate the impact of
the dolphin-safe label. Their results indicate that the dolphin-
safe label affected consumer behavior and the market share
of canned tuna. However, it is very difficult to compare this
paper (or its results) to our setting, because the label was
a label of approval and it was adopted in the study period
by the three largest tuna companies in the world. Moreover,
their paper also deviates methodologically from more recent
papers that look at the impact of environmental labels (includ-
ing our paper). Houde (2014) instead studies the effects of
Energy Star certification in the U.S. appliance market. Again,
the label studied is quite different in comparison to the car-
bon label in the United Kingdom, because the Energy Star
label is a label of approval and identifies the most energy effi-
cient products in the marketplace. Using a structural demand
model, he finds that consumers respond to certification in
different ways.
13. Note that the approach used in these studies is quite
different from ours, because experimental studies control for
salience and understanding of the label as well and they
also assume away search costs, all of which are likely to be
important in our case.
the back of the detergent, which may affect the
salience of the label.
Finally, the manner in which information
about environmental quality is communicated
to the consumer also appears to matter for the
emergence of a price premium. Information
about the environmental quality of a good can
be of many types. The two most common types
of indicators of environmental quality are (1)
simple labels of approval (e.g., an eco-label such
as the EU flower or the Nordic Swan), and (2)
labels showing detailed information on the prod-
uct in the same way as nutritional information
(e.g., energy cards or the information showing
the percentage of material made from recycled
materials). An eco-label informs the consumer
that the product is complying with a certain
standard of environmental quality. For labels
which involve detailed environmental informa-
tion, consumers can observe the exact “amount”
of an environmental attribute usually expressed
in numbers and possibly a scale to determine
whether the product is environmentally friendly
or not (rather like the Guideline Daily Amount
for nutritional information). Often, these labels
are mandatory, which means all the products in
the same product category have to be labeled.
Several studies using experimental field data
have documented that more information is not
always better and that consumers prefer sim-
pler information to more detailed information
(see BIO Intelligence Service 2012; Kiesel and
Villas-Boas 2013; Teisl, Rubin, and Noblet 2008;
Wansink and Chandon 2006; Wansink, Sonka,
and Hasler 2004).
In our case, the carbon label is voluntary,
which is why only some of the products in a prod-
uct category have the label. The specific form
of the carbon label used on detergents is called
the carbon reduction label and it indicates the
approximate amount of CO2 emissions generated
by the labeled product or detergent with the sen-
tence: “We have committed to reduce this car-
bon footprint.” In addition, the label indicates
the carbon footprint of a labeled product in the
same product category (see Figure 1).14 Previous
14. One could be skeptical about whether information
about the carbon footprint of a comparable product affects
consumers’ purchases. For the conscientious consumer who
reads the detailed information on each labeled product, the
information about the benchmark product does not add any
new information at all, while for the consumer who wants
to save time by just looking at the logo for the product the
information about the benchmark product is probably written
too small to be noticed or they may simply not use this
information anyway.
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FIGURE 1
An Example of a Carbon Reduction Label
research suggests that consumers appear to have
difficulties in understanding this label. Based
on the survey of 428 UK shoppers, Gadema
and Oglethorpe (2011) found that “81% either
strongly agreed or agreed that understanding car-
bon footprint information and comparing carbon
footprints was difficult and confusing.” Indeed,
by reading the carbon reduction label on a single
product, the consumer knows the CO2 emissions
generated by the labeled product, but does not
know whether this amount of CO2 emissions is
environmentally friendly. In order to understand
the label and to find the number of labeled prod-
ucts and their associated CO2 emissions, the con-
sumer needs to review all the products within the
product category. Even if all of this information
can be collected by the consumer, he/she does not
necessarily have a scale or a reference point to
understand this information. Thus, given the par-
ticular form of the carbon reduction label, it is
difficult to predict its impact on the market and
on prices. However, based on the theoretical and
empirical studies on environmental labels, we can
outline the following scenarios or predictions:
1. If consumers value the carbon reduction
label and interpret it perfectly, we would expect to
find a price premium that varies among different
labeled products.
2. If consumers have limited ability and use
the label as a proxy for environmental quality, we
would expect all labeled products (detergents) to
obtain the same price premium.15
15. This idea (or scenario) is based on a naive version
of Milgrom’s unraveling argument: the consumer observes
that the firm is disclosing something, and therefore expects
3. If consumers find it too complicated to
assess the labels, we would expect to find no
premium at all for any labeled product.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
A. Data
For our empirical analysis, we utilize a unique
data set based on a noted supermarket chain’s
scanner data. The data consist of detailed pur-
chase information on Clubcard account holders
of the supermarket chain, 60,000 customers in
total. This sample is a representative (random)
sample for all the Clubcard account holders of
this supermarket chain in the United Kingdom.
For these customers, we have detailed informa-
tion on product sales and daily transaction prices
of 339 distinct products. Among these products,
there are 43 detergents, the names of which are
given in Table 1.16 Of these 43 detergents, only
five detergents (shown in bold in Table 1) are
carbon labeled. All of these labeled detergents
belong to the supermarket brand that has many
detergents in the unlabeled category as well.17
These carbon-labeled products have the follow-
ing carbon footprints: (4) 700 g of CO2 per wash,
(7) 750 g of CO2 per wash, (17) 850 g of CO2 per
wash, (32) 700 g of CO2 per wash, and (41) 600
g of CO2 per wash. The label given on the back
of the product package informs customers of the
amount of CO2 emissions produced during the
product’s life cycle on average and demonstrates
a commitment to reduce the detergent’s carbon
footprint (Figure 1). In addition, the label gives
information on the carbon footprint of a bench-
mark product and advice on how customers could
reduce their carbon footprint even further, for
example, by reducing the washing temperature.
Our data consist of item-level transactions
for detergents for 60,000 customers for a period
of 104 weeks. The data consist of prices for
these detergents and categorical dummies for a
or assumes the labeled product to be better quality than the
other unlabeled product (see Milgrom and Roberts 1986).
16. We replace wherever appropriate in the product
names given in Table 1, the name of the supermarket chain
with the phrase “Own Brand.”
17. During the sample period, we consider in our analysis
the supermarket chain already had six different types of
products certified/labeled: toilet paper, kitchen rolls, laundry
detergents, chilled and long-life orange juice, light bulbs, and
Jaffa oranges/soft fruit. However, only a small number of
products had been labeled in each of these product categories.
The number of labeled products was smaller for other product
categories than for detergents, which is why we decided to
concentrate on detergents.
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TABLE 1
List of Detergent Products
(1) Fairy Liquitabs Non-Bio 11 Wash/385 G
(2) Fairy Non-Bio Liquid Wash 1.37 L
(3) Own Brand Bio Liquid Wash 1.5 L
(4) Own Brand Non-Bio Liquid Wash 1.5 L (Carbon
Labeled)
(5) Persil Powder Non-Bio 28 Wash/2.38 kg
(6) Own Brand Powder Bio 800 G
(7) Own Brand Non-Bio 1.2 kg (Carbon Labeled)
(8) Own Brand Powder Color 800 G
(9) Own Brand Value Bio Conc Liquid Wash 1 L
(10) Fairy Powder Non-Bio 10 Wash/800 G
(11) Persil Powder Non-Bio 10 Wash/850 G
(12) Own Brand Non-Bio Tablets 24 Pk 12 Washes/900 G
(13) Persil Tablets Non-Bio 24 Pack 12 Wash/912 G
(14) Own Brand Powder Non-Bio 30 Wash/2.4 kg
(15) Own Brand Color Liquid Capsules 10 Wash/500Ml
(16) Own Brand Bio Tablets 48 Pk 24 Washes/1.8 kg
(17) Own Brand Non-Bio Tablets 48 Pk 24 Washes/1.8
kg (Carbon Labeled)
(18) Own Brand Color Tablets 48 Pk 24 Washes/1.8 kg
(19) Persil Non-Bio Capsules 20 Pk 10 Wash
(20) Fairy Non-Bio Tablets 56 Pk 28 Wash/1.848 kg
(21) Persil Non-Bio Capsules 40 Pk 20 Wash
(22) Own Brand 2In1 Freshtablets 48 Pk 24 Washes/1.8 kg
(23) Persil Bio Liquigel 1.5 L
(24) Persil Non-Bio Liquigel 1.5 L
(25) Fairy Liquitabs Non-Bio 22 Wash/770 G
(26) Persil Tablets Non-Bio 48 Pack 24 Wsh 1.74 kg
(27) Own Brand Powder 2In1 Lavender 800 G
(28) Own Brand Lav 2In1 Liqd Wash 1.5 L
(29) Own Brand 2In1 Lav Tablets 48 Pk 24 Washes/1.8 kg
(30) Persil Non-Bio Small & Mighty 730Ml
(31) Surf Tropical Small & Mighty 730Ml
(32) Own brand Non-Bio Liquid Capsules 20 Wash/1 L
(Carbon Labeled)
(33) Own Brand Bio Liquid Capsules 20 Wash/1 L
(34) Own Brand Color Liquid Capsules 20 Wash/1 L
(35) Own Brand 2 In 1 Lavliquid Capsules 20 Wash/1 L
(36) Own Brand 2In1 Oceantablets 48 Pk 24 Wash/1.8 kg
(37) Surf Sunshine Small & Mighty 730Ml
(38) Persil Non-Bio Small & Mighty 1.47 L
(39) Own Brand Super Conc Color Liqd 700Ml/20 Wsh
(40) Own Brand Super Conc Bio Liquid 700Ml/20 Wsh
(41) Own Brand Super Conc Non-Bio Liqd Wash
700Ml/20 Wsh (Carbon Labeled)
(42) Own Brand Super Conc2In1 Lav Liqd 730Ml/20 Wsh
(43) Own Brand Powder Non-Bio 42 Wash/3.36 kg
number of product attributes like the type of
detergent, a supermarket brand dummy (i.e., a
dummy that indicates if the detergent is of the
same brand as the supermarket chain) as well
as other product attributes like the size of the
detergent. In addition, we also have detailed
information on the expenditure on the deter-
gent and whether the detergent was bought on a
price discount or whether the price at which the
detergent was bought was marked down.18 We
18. Some of these variables are used in our analysis,
although we note that in DID models time-invariant con-
trol variables or characteristics (such as detergent type)
become redundant.
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics: Detergent Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Carbon label 0.118 0.323 0 1 4,369
Own brand 0.61 0.488 0 1 4,369
Powder 0.296 0.457 0 1 4,369
Tablet 0.446 0.497 0 1 4,369
Liquid 0.258 0.438 0 1 4,369
Size 1.234 0.604 0.385 3.36 4,369
Price discount 0.078 0.252 0 1 4,369
Marked down 0.002 0.009 0 0.2 4,369
No. of washes 19.44 6.884 10 42 4,369
Two-in-one 0.166 0.372 0 1 4,369
Average price per
wash
0.168 0.057 0.044 0.362 4,369
note that it is particularly important to control
for promotions in our specification because the
effect of promotions is time-varying and typically
varies across products. We also note that if we did
not have access to transactions data on individual
products then it would not be possible to control
for promotions.
For tractability, we collapse (or aggregate)
the transactions level data to weekly level data.
Besides balancing the data, the use of weekly
level data allows us to reduce the autocorrela-
tion of price observations considerably. Our data
span from financial week 17 of 2007 to finan-
cial week 15 of 2009 (both weeks inclusive).
Therefore, we have data for a period of 104
weeks (36 weeks in 2007, 52 weeks in 2008, and
16 weeks in 2009). Note that the carbon reduc-
tion label came into effect on week 10 in May
2008, which means that the carbon reduction
label on the five aforementioned carbon-labeled
detergents was available only after week 10 in
2008. This fact is important because it allows us
to use a DID estimation approach and to control
for time-invariant unobserved product character-
istics both for labeled and unlabeled detergents.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the vari-
ables used in our analysis.
B. DID Regressions
Our aim is to investigate the effect that the car-
bon reduction label has on the prices of detergents
that have this label. As mentioned earlier, we
use two econometric techniques to test if carbon-
labeled detergents get a higher price than unla-
beled detergents—the DIDs and the synthetic
control method.
Our first method, the DID approach, is an
improvement over the traditional hedonic method
8 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
that is usually used in the extant literature to
isolate the effect that an environmental label has
on the price of a good. The conventional hedonic
approach, using cross-sectional data, isolates the
effect that an environmental label has on the price
of a good by regressing the price of a good on a
number of characteristics of the good including a
dummy for whether a good has a label. However,
in the cross-sectional setting, the hedonic method
cannot generally be used to estimate the causal
impact of the label (or the environmental qual-
ity) but only to obtain the degree of correlation
between the label and the price of a product (see,
e.g., Bajari and Benkard 2005). This is because,
typically, there are unobserved factors (product
characteristics, etc.) that are correlated both with
the product label and with product prices making
the label an endogenous characteristic.19
Fortunately, the carbon label for detergents
came into existence some time after the period
from when our data starts. Hence this provides a
market level quasi-experimental setting in which
we can observe labeled and unlabeled detergents
both before and after the carbon reduction labels
were introduced and use these labeled and unla-
beled products as treatment and control groups
in a standard DID setup. As there is no change
in any other product characteristics for labeled
and unlabeled detergents, we can use this quasi-
experimental setup to isolate the treatment effect
or consumers’ average marginal willingness to
pay for the carbon reduction label. Note that
we are actually measuring the average treatment
effect for the treated (ATT) which in the present
setting measures the amount by which the price
of detergents with the carbon reduction label have
changed relative to what the prices of these deter-
gents would have been without the label. As
usual, the DID estimator allows the treatment
assignment (i.e., which products are labeled)
to correlate with time-invariant product-specific
factors. However, consistent estimation of treat-
ment effect rests on the assumption of indepen-
dence of treatment assignment and unobserved
time-variant factors. We are not aware of any rea-
sons that would violate this assumption in the
present application. As the supermarket chain
in question labeled different kinds of products
with different footprints, treatment assignment
does not appear to be systematic or favorable to
19. For more detailed discussion on endogeneity prob-
lems in these kind of hedonic regressions, see for example,
Greenstone and Gayer (2009) and Kuminoff, Parmeter, and
Pope (2010).
the most potential (or effective) products. Yet, it
should be recognized that as only a small num-
ber of products were labeled, the treatment effect
estimate obtained with the DID method might
only be representative for the labeled products
as well as for the product category considered in
the study.
C. Synthetic Control Method
In the DID specification, we test for the emer-
gence of a price premium in a simple label versus
no label setup. The basic DID specification is not
flexible enough to allow for different labels to
have different effects on the prices of the carbon-
labeled detergents. To elucidate: in our data, the
group of labeled detergent products includes both
high and low carbon footprint detergents (vary-
ing from 650 g of CO2 emissions to 800 g of CO2
per wash), but our DID specification does not take
this detailed information on the numerical value
of the carbon footprint into account while esti-
mating the treatment effect.
To allow for carbon reduction labels that have
different carbon footprints (i.e., show different
numbers for the grams of CO2 emitted) to have
different effects on detergent prices and to lend
robustness to our earlier results from the DID
specification, we use the synthetic control method
following the approach outlined by Abadie, Dia-
mond, and Hainmueller (2010).20 In the syn-
thetic control method, we construct, in turn, for
each carbon-labeled detergent, an artificial or
“synthetic” product or detergent which in all
other product characteristics is as close as possi-
ble to the actual carbon-labeled detergent except
that this artificial detergent does not have the
carbon reduction label. This method is flexible
enough to allow detergents with different (low
and high) carbon footprints to have different
effects on detergent prices. Another advantage of
the synthetic method is that it does not require
us to assume that unobserved factors affecting
price are fixed over time or that the time trends
of prices for labeled and unlabeled detergents
20. Another option would be to use the DID setup and
interact the treatment group and period indicators with an
indicator for each labeled product. However, this approach
has a few weaknesses at least in the context of our applica-
tion. First, it requires stronger assumptions than the synthetic
control method (common trend and functional form assump-
tions). Second, the problem with this kind of regression in
our setting is that we would then have five treatments (differ-
ent labels), but only one product for each treatment. Although
this kind of regression can be estimated, statistical infer-
ence on the interaction terms is not reliable as discussed in
the introduction.
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are the same pretreatment (as required by the
DID specification). In addition, the synthetic
method is fully nonparametric in the sense that no
explicit functional form or distributional assump-
tions are required.
The synthetic control method generates
an artificial or synthetic control unit using a
weighted average or a convex combination
of the observed control units.21 We treat the
carbon-labeled detergent as the treatment group
(or treated unit) and the unlabeled detergents
as the control group. Our outcome of interest is
the logarithmic (normalized) price. Using the
synthetic control method, we iteratively pro-
duce synthetic controls (or construct synthetic
products) for each of the five carbon-labeled
detergents. The group of detergents that com-
prises the control group does not, of course,
comprise any of the five carbon-labeled deter-
gents. After obtaining the synthetic control as a
convex combination of unlabeled detergents, we
graphically plot and compare the actual observed
price trajectory (over time) of the carbon-labeled
detergent with the estimated counterfactual price
trajectory for the synthetic detergent (this is the
price trajectory that would have resulted for the
carbon-labeled detergent if the detergent had not
been carbon labeled).
IV. RESULTS
A. DID Specifications
A common criticism of the DID approach
is the uncertainty whether the control group is
able to faithfully reproduce the outcome that
would have been observed in the counterfactual
situation in the absence of the treatment. In our
setting, this requirement translates to whether
the detergents which do not have the carbon
reduction label are able to mimic the counter-
factual behavior of the carbon-labeled detergents
had these carbon-labeled detergents, not actually
been carbon labeled. As we are looking at the
21. The idea behind the synthetic control method is that
a (convex) combination of control units provides a better
counter-factual for the treated unit than any single control
unit alone. In our case, labeled detergents form the treatment
group while unlabeled detergents form the control group.
For K unlabeled detergents, we assign weights W = (w1, w2,
… , wK) (with wk ≥ 0 and Lwk = 1) to each of these control
detergents. The weights are chosen so that the synthetic
detergent resembles the actual carbon-labeled detergent as
much as possible. We refer the interested reader to Abadie
et al. (2010) for additional technical details and to Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) for an economic application.
effect of the labeling (treatment) on detergent
prices (outcome), what we need to first ensure
is that the unlabeled detergents follow the same
price trend pre-treatment as the carbon-labeled
detergents. The usual approach in the literature
is to use data from the pretreatment period(s)
to show that the time trends of the treatment
(carbon-labeled detergents) and the control (unla-
beled detergents) groups are the same for the out-
come variable in question. We show such a graph
in Figure 2 that plots the time trends for aver-
age logarithmic prices (across weeks) for carbon-
labeled and unlabeled detergents. As shown in
Figure 2, the price trends in the pretreatment
period are very similar for the carbon-labeled and
unlabeled detergents.22 The graph also suggests
that labeling does not have much of an impact on
the prices of the carbon-labeled detergents (the
treatment group) post-treatment.
We now present the results of the DID regres-
sions that we use to investigate the effects of
carbon labeling on the transaction prices for
carbon-labeled detergents. Our DID specification
is the following:
log (price)it = β0 + γ3
(
CarbonLabeli(2)
∗ TreatPeriodt
)
+ 𝛃′Xit + δi
+
∑
t
(WeekDummies)t + εit
whereCarbonLabeli and TreatPeriodt are defined
as follows:
CarbonLabeli
=
{
1 if detergent is carbon-labeled product
0 otherwise.
TreatPeriodt
=
{
1 if Week >= Week 10 in 2008
0 otherwise.
Note that we use the logarithm of normal-
ized price as the dependent variable. Normal-
ization is done by dividing the (money) price
of the detergent with the number of washes
the detergent has on average. This normaliza-
tion gives us the price per wash which makes
22. We also drew the same graph using only the super-
market’s own products (labeled and unlabeled detergents).
The price trends are very similar for these two groups
of products in this case also. For more details, please
see Appendix S1.
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FIGURE 2
Price Plots of Carbon-Labeled and Unlabeled Detergents
The carbon dummy came into effect in 
week 46 as shown by this vertical line
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Source: Scanner level data from a noted supermarket chain (collapsed from the transaction level to the week level)
Legend
different-sized detergent products comparable.23
In addition, we use a logarithmic transforma-
tion for the dependent variable for the ease
of interpretation (coefficients can be interpreted
as percentage changes).24 The week dummies∑
t (WeekDummies)t in the specification above
control for any possible exogenous time trends
(expected mean change) in the log price of deter-
gents during the sample period that affects all
detergent products. In some regressions, the vec-
tor Xit consists of the following control vari-
ables Xit = {Price Discount Dummyit, Marked
Down Dummyit}. Note that in the DID specifi-
cation given in Equation (2), we include product
fixed effects (for product i) denoted in the above
specification as δi. The coefficient of interest
is γ3, the coefficient of the interaction term
(CarbonLabeli * TreatPeriodt), which shows the
differential impact of carbon labeling on the
price of the carbon-labeled detergents using the
23. We also estimate the main models without using any
normalization. The results are very similar and consistent
with our results presented later. For more details, please see
Appendix S1.
24. Again, the results and conclusions are not sensitive to
this choice.
corresponding changes for all other unlabeled
detergent products as control.25
The results of the DID regressions are reported
in Table 3. We first report the regression results
for a simple OLS specification, where product-
specific fixed effects are not controlled for in col-
umn 1. Column 2 reports the results of the same
regression with additional controls. Columns 3
and 4 report the results of regressions which
control for product fixed effects and which con-
trol for the standard errors involved in the esti-
mation process in different ways. Note that the
prices of individual products are quite heav-
ily autocorrelated over time and also correlated
within product category (including time dum-
mies mitigates but does not totally remove the
autocorrelation). It is important to address the
problems caused by these two issues in the
estimation process. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mul-
lainathan (2004) show that conventional stan-
dard errors often severely understate the standard
deviation of the estimators in the DID framework.
25. We also consider a simple OLS regression (i.e.,
without product fixed effects), where the DID specification
is the conventional specification used in the literature:
log (price)it = β0 + γ1CarbonLabeli + γ2TreatPeriodt +
γ3
(
CarbonLabeli ∗ TreatPeriodt
)
+
∑
t (WeekDummies)t +
εit
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TABLE 3
Price Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS (clustered SE) OLS w/ controls (clustered SE) FE (clustered SE) FE (bootstrap SE)
CarbonLabel * TreatPeriod –.065 −.064 −.069 –.069
(.071) (.070) (.068) (.066)
CarbonLabel –.133 −.138
(.097) (.099)
TreatPeriod .033 .019
(.031) (.031)
Price Discount −.237*** −.189*** –.189***
(.061) (.022) (.021)
Marked Down 1.381 −.695* –.695*
(1.222) (.284) (.285)
Product Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obvs. 4,369 4,369 4,369 4,369
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of normalized price. Normalization is done by dividing the (money) price of the
detergent with the number of washes the detergent has on average. Independent variables are given in the rows. Price Discount
is a dummy for detergents that are offered on a price discount. Marked Down is a dummy for detergents that are marked down.
CarbonLabel is a dummy variable which is 1 for detergents that are carbon-labeled and 0 for detergents that are not carbon
labeled. TreatPeriod is a dummy which is 1 for the post-treatment period or the period after May 2008, the date at which the
carbon label came into effect, and 0 for periods before this date or the pretreatment period. The DID estimator is the coefficient
on the interaction term CarbonLabel * TreatPeriod. t-Statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. OLS, ordinary least
squares regression; FE, fixed effects regression; SE, standard errors.
Significance at +p< 0.10; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p< 0.001.
They propose using block-bootstrapped standard
errors. So in Table 3 we report the results of the
DID regression with product fixed effects using
both clustered standard errors (in column 3) and
bootstrapped standard errors (in column 4). We
note that for all results reported in Table 3, we
use heteroskedastic robust standard errors. Also,
all reported standard errors are clustered at the
product level.26
The regression results in Table 4 show that the
coefficient of γ3 (the coefficient of the interaction
term CarbonLabeli * TreatTimet ) is negative and
nearly zero in all the four different specifications
considered. The coefficient is not statistically sig-
nificant in any of specifications considered. In
addition, when we use the bootstrapped stan-
dard errors the results are highly insignificant.
Given the small magnitude of the coefficient in
all cases, we can conclude that there is no per-
ceptible difference in the prices between carbon-
labeled and unlabeled products after the carbon
reduction label came into effect. In other words,
our results show that the labeling does not affect
26. To address the autocorrelation issue, we also use an
alternative approach suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). We
collapse the data to two time periods (before and after the
introduction of the labels) and estimate the regression model
using the collapsed data. The results were very similar to the
results in Table 3. For more details, please see Appendix S1.
the prices of carbon-labeled detergents relative to
unlabeled detergents.27
Based on our earlier discussion (see Section
II) we think that the small magnitude of the
coefficient and the insignificant treatment effects
(for most specifications) is not surprising. How-
ever, it is important to emphasize that zero aver-
age impact does not conclusively show (at least
for now) that the carbon reduction labels do not
have any impact on prices, because it does not
rule out the possibility that some of the labels
may have had a positive effect on price and
some of the labels may have had a negative
effect on price. Therefore, we need to investigate
how the labels may have affected the prices of
individual detergents.
B. Synthetic Control Approach
The regressions results in the previous section
suggest that on average there is little to no
change in the price of carbon-labeled detergents
compared to unlabeled detergents. Next, we
27. For robustness, we also rerun regression 2 earlier
by limiting our sample only to those detergents that belong
to the supermarket chain. We find that the interaction term
CarbonLabeli * TreatTimet is insignificant in all specifica-
tions considered (these are the same specifications that we
used in the columns of Table 3) indicating that the impact of
the carbon label is insignificant. So our main result is again
robust to using this alternative control group. For more details,
please see Appendix S1.
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TABLE 4
Demand Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS
(clustered SE)
OLS w/ controls
(clustered SE)
FE
(clustered SE)
FE w/
(bootstrap SE)
CarbonLabel * TreatPeriod .157 .021 .014 .014
(.197) (.140) (.130) (.123)
CarbonLabel .034 .091
(.387) (.128)
TreatPeriod −.104 .104
(.092) (.109)
Price Discount −.075 −.025 −.025
(.055) (.044) (.041)
Marked Down −1.884 −1.200 −1.200
(1.402) (1.134) (1.197)
Average Price .067* −.141* −.141*
(.033) (.064) (.065)
Sum Expenditure .003*** .002*** .002***
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Mean Detergent Price .060 .338* .659*
(.106) (.160) (.327)
Product Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Week Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obvs. 4,369 4,369 4,369 4,369
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of spending on detergents for a week over the total spending on all
products for a week. Independent variables are given in the rows. Price Discount is a dummy for detergents that are offered
on a price discount. Marked Down is a dummy for detergents that are marked down. Average price denotes the own price of
the detergent (averaged by week). Mean Detergent price denotes the average price of substitutes. Sum Expenditure denotes the
aggregate spending on detergents in that week. CarbonLabel is a dummy variable which is 1 for detergents that are carbon labeled
and 0 for detergents that are not carbon labeled. TreatPeriod is a dummy which is 1 for the post-treatment period or the period after
May 2008, the date at which the carbon label came into effect and 0 for periods before this date or the pretreatment period. The
DID estimator is the coefficient on the interaction term CarbonLabel * TreatPeriod. t-Statistics reported under each coefficient
in parenthesis. OLS, ordinary least squares regression; FE, fixed effects regression; SE, standard errors.
Significance at +p< 0.10; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p< 0.001.
use the synthetic control method to investigate
whether one or several of the five carbon-labeled
detergents have product-specific price changes
that differ from the price changes of similar
unlabeled detergents. As mentioned earlier, we
construct the synthetic control for each carbon-
labeled detergent. To this end, we use the follow-
ing set of variables as given by the vector X̃ (note
that this vector excludes the treatment dummy
and the dummy for the treatment period and
their interaction):
X̃ = {TabletDummy,LiquidDummy,Twoinone
Dummy,PriceDiscountDummy,MarkedDown
Dummy,Numberofwashes,OwnBrandDummy}
These variables are the criteria that we use
to create convex combinations of unlabeled
detergents from the control group for each
carbon-labeled detergent (in turn).28
28. For the synthetic control method, we have had to drop
a few detergents for which we did not have data for all 104
In odd-numbered Tables 5–13, we show the
weights that each detergent in the control group
(not carbon labeled) has in the synthetic approx-
imation of the actual treatment detergent (carbon
labeled). To illustrate, detergent no. 4 (Own
Brand Non-Bio Liquid Wash 1.5 L as given in the
fourth entry in the list of detergents in Table 1) is a
carbon-labeled detergent. The synthetic detergent
4 comprises a convex combination of other con-
trol or unlabeled detergents with weights given in
Table 5. Detergent 3 gets a high weight of 0.973
in this convex combination whereas detergent 9
gets a weight of only 0.006 in this convex com-
bination. Note that all weights are non-negative
weeks. For example, for detergent number 2 we did not have
data from week 98, for detergent 12 we did not have data
from weeks 24 to 47, and so on. So we had to drop detergent
numbers 2, 12, 33, 35, and 38 from the data set used in the
analysis. We also had to drop data for some periods (weeks)
for which we had data missing on the outcome of interest (log
of the average price per wash). For example, in week 1, we
have data for only 37 detergents and similarly for week 2 we
also have data only on 37 detergents. So we had to drop week
numbers 1, 2, 3, 75, 83, 91, and 95.
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TABLE 5
Detergent Weights in Synthetic Unit for
Detergent No. 4
Treatment Detergent No. 4
Control
Detergent No. Weight
Control
Detergent No. Weight
1 0 23 0.002
3 0.973 24 0
5 0 25 0
6 0 26 0
8 0 27 0
9 0.006 28 0
10 0 29 0
11 0 30 0
13 0 31 0
14 0 34 0
15 0 36 0
16 0 37 0
18 0 39 0
19 0 40 0.018
20 0 42 0
21 0 43 0
22 0
TABLE 6
Log(price) Predictor Means for Detergent No. 4
Log(price) Predictor Means
Treatment Detergent No. 4
Variables Real Synthetic
Number of washes 17 17.031
Two in one dummy 0 0
Own brand dummy 1 0.997
Powder dummy 0 0
Liquid dummy 1 0.999
Tablet dummy 0 0
Discount (average) 0.0333569 0.0329327
Mark down (average) 0.0003054 0.0000147
(most of the weights being zero) and sum to one.
Also note that none of the other carbon-labeled
detergents (nos. 7, 17, 32, and 41) are in the con-
trol group that make up the synthetic detergent.
Thus, the synthetic control method constructs
the counterfactual using only the most similar
control units.
We also list the pretreatment characteristics
of the actual carbon-labeled detergent along
with its synthetic counterpart for each carbon-
labeled detergent (i.e., for detergent nos. 4, 7, 17,
32, and 41) and show these in even-numbered
Tables 6–14. So, for example, from Table 6 for
detergent 4 we find that while the actual detergent
has 17 washes, the synthetic detergent has 17.03
washes (and a similar interpretation holds
for other characteristics as well). Therefore,
the synthetic detergent provides a reasonable
TABLE 7
Detergent Weights in Synthetic Unit for
Detergent No. 7
Treatment Detergent No.7
Control
Detergent No. Weight
Control
Detergent No. Weight
1 0 23 0
3 0 24 0
5 0 25 0
6 0.662 26 0
8 0.182 27 0
9 0 28 0
10 0 29 0
11 0 30 0
13 0 31 0
14 0 34 0
15 0 36 0
16 0 37 0
18 0 39 0
19 0 40 0
20 0 42 0
21 0 43 0.156
22 0
TABLE 8
Log(price) Predictor Means for Detergent No. 7
Log(price) Predictor Means
Treatment Detergent No. 7
Variables Real Synthetic
Number of washes 15 14.992
Two in one dummy 0 0
Own brand dummy 1 1
Powder dummy 1 1
Liquid dummy 0 0
Tablet dummy 0 0
Discount (average) 0 0
Mark down (average) 0.0061858 0.006187
approximation to the pretreatment characteristics
of the actual detergent. We also note from the
other even-numbered tables (Tables 8–14) that
for all carbon-labeled detergents, the synthetic
detergent appears to mirror the pretreatment
characteristics of the actual detergent accurately.
Next, we plot the actual and counterfactual
trajectories of the outcome of interest, namely,
the logarithmic price of the actual carbon-labeled
detergent and the synthetic detergent, which
shows what would have happened if the carbon-
labeled detergent had not been labeled. We repeat
the exercise for all five detergents. We show these
actual and counterfactual price trajectories for
the carbon-labeled products in Figures 3–7.
These graphs show that in the pretreatment
period the price trajectories of the counterfac-
tual product (synthetic control) are almost iden-
tical for observed price changes for the actual
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TABLE 9
Detergent Weights in Synthetic Unit for
Detergent No. 17
Treatment Detergent No.17
Control
Detergent No. Weight
Control
Detergent No. Weight
1 0 23 0
3 0 24 0
5 0 25 0
6 0 26 0
8 0 27 0
9 0 28 0
10 0 29 0
11 0 30 0
13 0 31 0
14 0 34 0
15 0 36 0
16 0.458 37 0
18 0.541 39 0
19 0 40 0
20 0 42 0
21 0 43 0
22 0
TABLE 10
Log(price) Predictor Means for Detergent
No. 17
Log(price) Predictor Means
Treatment Detergent No. 17
Variables Real Synthetic
Number of washes 24 23.976
Two in one dummy 0 0
Supermarket store dummy 1 0.999
Powder dummy 0 0
Liquid dummy 0 0
Tablet dummy 1 0.999
Discount (average) 0 0
Mark down (average) 0.0035762 0.0035729
labeled products. The only exception is the sec-
ond labeled product, but even for this case the
price difference between labeled and synthetic
product appear to stay constant before and after
the treatment.
In agreement with the results of the DIDs
approach, the price trajectories of the actual
detergent and its synthetic control move together
very closely both pre- and post-treatment (i.e.,
after the carbon label actually came into effect
on the 10th week of 2008 as shown by a vertical
dotted line). This result suggests that the carbon
footprint on the detergent products did not have
any effect on the prices of these products. Impor-
tantly, this is the case for all five labeled products,
which appear to indicate that there is no price pre-
mium for any of the carbon-labeled detergents.
TABLE 11
Detergent Weights in Synthetic Unit for
Detergent No. 32
Treatment Detergent No.32
Control
Detergent No. Weight
Control
Detergent No. Weight
1 0 23 0
3 0 24 0
5 0 25 0
6 0 26 0
8 0 27 0
9 0 28 0
10 0 29 0.005
11 0 30 0
13 0 31 0
14 0 34 0.971
15 0.014 36 0
16 0 37 0
18 0 39 0
19 0 40 0
20 0.01 42 0
21 0 43 0
22 0
TABLE 12
Log(price) Predictor Means for Detergent
No. 32
Log(price) Predictor Means
Treatment Detergent No. 32
Variables Real Synthetic
Number of washes 20 19.96
Two in one dummy 0 0.005
Own brand dummy 1 0.99
Powder dummy 0 0
Liquid dummy 0 0
Tablet dummy 1 1
Discount (average) 0 0.0004813
Mark down (average) 0.001897 0.002492
V. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Price Impacts
We think that the most plausible explana-
tion for our results is that customers find it dif-
ficult to notice, understand, and compare car-
bon footprints of different detergents and there-
fore do not reward carbon-labeled or less car-
bon intensive products with a price premium.
Our explanation is consistent with the finding of
Teisl et al. (2008), who show that price premi-
ums are more difficult to find for labels which
have detailed information as this information is
cognitively more difficult for the consumer to
process. Similarly, Wansink et al. (2004) show
that more information is not always better and
their result suggests that people generate better
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FIGURE 3
Price Trajectory for Own Brand Non-Bio Liquid Wash 1.5 L
0 20 40 60 80 100
weeknos
treated unit synthetic control unit 
lo
g 
av
er
ag
e 
pr
ic
e 
pe
r 
w
as
h
−
2.
2 
−
2.
1 
−
2 
−
1.
9 
−
1.
8 
FIGURE 4
Price Trajectory for Own Brand Non-Bio 1.2 kg
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inferences from short claims than from long
claims on the front label. More recently, Muller
and Ruffieux (2011) show how the design of the
label may affect consumer behavior. In a labo-
ratory experiment with 364 subjects, they find
that consumer responses to nutritional logos vary
among different logos and on average consumer
response is better for those logos that simplify
the message most. Similar results are found in
a report published by the European Commission
on the design of an environmental index. BIO
Intelligence Service (2012) studied consumer
preferences for different kinds of label designs
using a survey of over 1,500 people in three
different European countries. The results suggest
that consumers prefer a scale which can be
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FIGURE 5
Price Trajectory for Own Brand Non-Bio Tablets 48 Pack 24 Washes/1.8 kg
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FIGURE 6
Price Trajectory for Own brand Non-Bio Liquid Capsules 20 Wash/1 L
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expressed as a color code system, such as a
traffic light system.29 Upham, Dendler, and Bleda
(2011) conducted interviews on a sample of
people asking them specific questions about their
29. It is stated in the report that: “Labels that present the
performance of a product on a comparative scale, such as star,
letters or numbers, or a color code system are vastly preferred
and are more easily understood and motivating than those that
present technical information only.”
understanding of the carbon footprint and found
that people misunderstood or had cognitive diffi-
culties in processing the information on the label.
The results from all of these different studies
support the idea that the carbon reduction label
is difficult to understand.
In the context of the carbon reduction label,
the aforementioned results would suggest that
the label could be more effective if, instead of
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FIGURE 7
Price Trajectory for Own Brand Super Conc. Non-Bio Liquid Wash 700 Ml/20 Washes
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TABLE 13
Detergent Weights in Synthetic Unit for
Detergent No. 41
Treatment Detergent No.41
Control
Detergent No. Weight
Control
Detergent No. Weight
1 0 23 0
3 0 24 0
5 0 25 0
6 0 26 0
8 0 27 0
9 0 28 0
10 0 29 0
11 0 30 0
13 0 31 0
14 0 34 0
15 0 36 0
16 0 37 0
18 0 39 0.449
19 0 40 0.55
20 0 42 0
21 0 43 0
22 0
simply indicating the level of CO2 emissions in
grams, it would (instead) signal which detergents
have a high carbon footprint and which detergents
have a low carbon footprint. This would make
it more likely for the consumer to be aware of
the carbon reduction label and also to have a
scale in order to understand this information (and
not just the absolute value). These conclusions
TABLE 14
Log(price) Predictor Means for Detergent No.
41
Log(price) Predictor Means
Treatment Detergent No. 41
Variables Real Synthetic
Number of washes 20 19.98
Two in one dummy 0 0
Own brand dummy 1 0.999
Powder dummy 0 0
Liquid dummy 1 0.999
Tablet dummy 0 0
Discount (average) 0 0
Mark down (average) 0.0005066 0.0005059
are also consistent with the experimental findings
of Michaud et al. (2013), who find that a much
simpler type of carbon label affects consumers’
behavior in experimental conditions.
Of course, it is possible that there are rea-
sons other than cognitive difficulties in under-
standing the carbon reduction label that might
explain our results. First, we note that the spe-
cific time frame of our study is exceptional as
the recorded purchases took place during the
credit crunch. The economic crisis may have tem-
pered pro-environmental behavior from the con-
sumers as well as their budget for green prod-
uct purchases. Second, it is also possible that
the product category could affect the efficacy of
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labeling in the sense that carbon labeling could
be more effective for products with higher budget
shares or because detergents are like an “inven-
tory” good for which promotions and discounts
play a key role. Third, and maybe most impor-
tantly, it is possible that consumers have actually
responded to carbon labeling, but their response
is not reflected in price but in the quantity pur-
chased. We find the last explanation quite plau-
sible and therefore we consider it in detail in the
next subsection.
B. Demand Effects
So far we have focused exclusively on look-
ing at the price impacts of the carbon reduc-
tion label. It is possible that the carbon reduction
label could have had an impact on the demand
of carbon-labeled products that is not reflected
in the price. Hence, it is interesting to look at
the direct demand effects of the labeling. Unfor-
tunately, as we do not have product-level aggre-
gate sales data for different detergent products but
only for our sample of consumers (60,000 Club-
card account holders) it might be challenging to
uncover demand functions for the carbon-labeled
products using our data. Note that the demand
estimation is also complicated by the fact that we
do not observe people’s purchases in the stores
of other supermarket chains. This implies that we
do not, for example, observe whether there may
have been systematic changes in market shares
of certain products or in the buying behavior of
customers. Because of these reasons, our data are
less suitable for estimating demand models than
price models.
Despite these difficulties, as a robustness
check we estimated simple demand models for
detergents. For these estimations, we once again
used the DID approach, but now our dependent
variable is the (logarithm of the) expenditure
share of individual detergent products. As
regressors we use the same explanatory variables
that we used in the price models. Following stan-
dard demand models, we included own price, the
average price of substitutes (or detergents), and
aggregate spending on detergents as additional
regressors. Note that we need to control for these
variables, because the treatment indicator is not
necessarily uncorrelated with these variables.
However, our results are not sensitive to the
exclusion of these variables.
The regression results for the DID demand
regressions are presented in Table 4.
In the demand models that include fixed
effects, the coefficient estimates of price and
expenditure variables are statistically significant
and have the expected signs (i.e., own price
has a negative effect and substitute price and
expenditure have positive effects on the quantity
purchased). The treatment effect of the label
on demand is positive in all models, but is far
from significant (when correct standard errors
are used). Moreover, numerically the estimate is
small which indicates that the demand impact
on carbon-labeled detergents is negligible. How-
ever, it is worth emphasizing that these estimation
results can be sensitive to our specific sample,
which is not necessarily a representative sample
for all the customers of the supermarket chain
(but only for the Clubcard account holders).
This is not an issue in price regressions, because
price effects should be representative for all the
customers and not just for Clubcard account
holders (at least when discounts are controlled
for). This is why the results of the demand
estimation may be less reliable or robust than the
results we obtain on detergent prices. In any case,
we think that it is safe to say that these results
strengthen our conclusion that nonexistent price
impacts originate from the consumer side and
from consumers’ problems in understanding
these labels.
C. Design of Carbon Reduction Labels
It is important to understand why the Carbon
Trust Fund adopted the carbon reduction label
and the rationale behind the particular design of
this label. We briefly discuss below some of the
reasons why this might be so.
We believe that to reduce the carbon footprint
of products, the Carbon Trust Fund intended to
design a label which supposedly would have wide
accessibility. As the carbon reduction label is a
voluntary label, it appears that the idea was that
if the label was easily accessible (and thus more
attractive to firms) then it was more likely that
it would be adopted by many firms and used on
a number of different products.30 In its current
form, the carbon reduction label allows a firm
to use the carbon reduction label to certify all
its products whatever their level of CO2 emis-
sions. Thus, any firm can have the label as long as
30. Koos (2011) shows that a larger supply of
environmental-labeled goods within the market increases the
likelihood of purchasing these goods. Indeed, the availability
of these labeled products in the supermarket is a necessary
condition for the purchase of the labeled good. Moreover,
his results indicate that the larger the share of major retailers
using the label, the more likely the labeled product is bought.
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it commits itself to reducing the CO2 emissions
of its product within 2 years. In comparison, a
simple label of approval or a traffic light sys-
tem can be much more financially demanding for
the firm and this high cost may become a bar-
rier for the adoption of these labels.31 We think
that the Carbon Trust Fund aimed to spread the
use of the carbon reduction label so that even if
the actual reduction in emissions for any product
is small (as compared to, say, a easier to under-
stand traffic light label system) the cumulative
reduction in emissions achieved from all products
(adopting this label) taken together would mean
a sufficient overall reduction in the total level of
carbon emissions.
However, we note that none of the other
major supermarket chains in the United King-
dom except this particular supermarket chain
adopted carbon reduction labels for their prod-
ucts. It appears that this general lack of adoption
of the label and its (consequent) lack of prolifer-
ation has affected its efficacy. In fact, the super-
market chain in question has recently gone on
record complaining about how other supermarket
chains have not followed its example of imple-
menting carbon reduction labels and it is think-
ing of even giving up on the carbon reduction
label.32 So why did the other supermarket chains
not adopt this label? Although the labeling pro-
cess is very easy, it is still costly to implement the
label. Given this cost we believe that firms would
be willing to adopt the label only if they expect
to obtain a price premium and/or an increase in
demand for the labeled products to make it worth-
while for them to apply for the label and use it.33
As previously argued, a simple label of approval
or a traffic light labeling system in the front pack-
age is more likely to be noticed and is therefore
more likely to generate a price premium for the
labeled products. We believe that ambiguity as to
whether a price premium would actually emerge
for labeled products has prevented other firms
31. With a simple label of approval, a firm might have to
make improvements or investments in its production process
to raise the environmental quality of its products above the
level imposed by the label and this could be costly. With
a traffic light label, a firm’s products could end up being
classified as environmentally unfriendly and therefore the
firm could be reluctant to apply for such a label.
32. See the report on the supermarket chain in the article
by Adam Vaughan in the guardian.co.uk, Monday, January
30, 2012, 15.02 GMT.
33. Firms endure some certification costs related to the
monitoring and assessment of the CO2 emissions disclosed as
well as packaging costs. For instance, the noted supermarket
chain claims “a minimum of several months’ work” to calcu-
late the carbon footprint of a product.
from adopting the label.34 The supermarket chain
in question may have committed itself too soon
in adopting the label and so it is now keen to roll
back the label.
Another reason why the Carbon Trust Fund
might have adopted the carbon reduction label
in its current form, that is, as a label which dis-
closes the exact level of CO2 emissions gener-
ated by a product (instead of having a simple
label of approval or adopting a traffic light sys-
tem) could be just to educate consumers. If con-
sumers observe the exact number of grams of
CO2 emissions from a product, they may become
aware about the impact of their carbon consump-
tion on the level of CO2 emissions released. This
is similar to, say, a Guide Daily Amount (GDA)
scale, which is used to educate consumers about
the nutritional characteristic of a product. More-
over, observing the CO2 emissions for each prod-
uct allows the consumer to compare not only
products within the same category but also prod-
ucts across categories. We note though that it
would probably take quite a long time before con-
sumers become accustomed to evaluating infor-
mation about carbon emissions in the products
they consume in this way. This is especially hard
since comparison across product categories is
complicated. For example, 100 g of CO2 emis-
sions could be the signal of a green product in
the detergent category but could signal a brown
product for apples. The value of the level of CO2
emissions cannot be understood only by itself but
needs to be compared along a range of other val-
ues. Therefore, we think that the use of a scale
or a traffic light could complement the disclosing
of the exact amount of CO2 emissions. Ideally, a
short front package logo could complement more
detailed information at the back and could be eas-
ier to notice and understand. Actually, the Car-
bon Trust has recently introduced two new labels
which are simpler and convey less information.
These labels are more like labels of approval.35
We think that decreasing the cognitive cost of
label comprehension could increase the likeli-
hood of its purchase and lead to the emergence of
a price premium while at the same time achieving
consumer education.
34. Harbaugh et al. (2011) show that the quality and the
number of products having a label may impact the size of the
potential price premium.
35. See the following website for more information:
http://www.carbontrust.com/client-services/footprinting/
footprint-certification/carbon-footprint-label
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the impact of the carbon
reduction label for prices of detergents. We
utilized detailed scanner data from a noted UK
supermarket chain recording consumers’ trans-
action prices before and after the introduction of
the carbon reduction labels to evaluate the effects
of the labeling. Our regression results, based on a
DID approach, indicate that the carbon reduction
label has no impact on prices, that is, on average
there is no premium for detergents that have a
carbon reduction label compared with detergents
that do not have a carbon reduction label. We also
did not find any demand impact for the carbon
reduction label, although the results of simple
demand models need to be interpreted with cau-
tion. We also used the synthetic control method
to allow for the effect of the carbon reduction
label to be different for products with different
carbon footprints. We did not find any evidence
to indicate that prices would have been different
for individual labeled products with low/high
levels of carbon footprint than for the coun-
terfactual synthetic products without the label.
Therefore, the results from the DID regression
as well as the synthetic control method appear to
outline a consistent story. The evidence appears
to be quite strong that there does not exist a price
premium for carbon-labeled detergents.
As we discussed in this study, our results
may appear somewhat surprising since one would
expect that the presence of an environmental label
should lead to an increase in price when con-
sumers value the environmental attribute. This
appears to be the case for carbon labels in gen-
eral according to several surveys. However, we
believe that the specific design of this carbon
label is responsible for its lack of success. The
specific form of the label used includes detailed
information on carbon emissions and it is diffi-
cult for consumers to process this information. It
is therefore important to investigate the effective-
ness of simpler carbon labels in the future. Since
our analysis concentrated on detergents, in future
research it would be also important to study the
effectiveness of carbon label for other products or
product categories.
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